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Environment, Natural Resources
and Land Use
By J. William Futrell*
During the survey period, both the courts and the legislature moved to
resolve basic uncertainties as to the validity of land use, natural resource,
and environmental protection laws and regulations. In Barrett v. Hamby,'
the court clarified the relationship between the taking clause and police
power regulation and moved to a position closer to the mainstream of
American law. The General Assembly sought to resolve any doubts as to
the State's ability to legislate in the land use and natural resource protection field by adding language to the proposed editorial revision of the state
constitution which specifically bases future land use and natural resource
protection laws on the State's police power. The Georgia Supreme Court's
validation of three recently passed natural resource protection laws as
constitutional eased the concern over the court's past hostility toward
planning laws and, in two landmark cases, the court recognized the implications of the energy crisis for public utility rate regulation and defined
the limits of public ownership and control of the state's beaches.
I.

THE POWER TO GOVERN

The year's most significant decision was the Georgia Supreme Court's
clarification of the interplay between the taking clauses of the United
States and Georgia Constitutions' and resource legislation and regulation
based on the state's inherent police power to protect the health and welfare
of its people. While Georgia's leaders have acknowledged the need for

additional environmental and resource laws based on a comprehensive
regional planning mechanism, initiatives for such laws have faltered because of a persistent strand of hostile decisions of the Georgia Supreme
Court 3 which have caused doubt as to the state's authority to act. Although
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Tulane University
(B.A., 1957); Columbia University (LL.B., 1965).
1. 235 Ga. 262, 219 S.E.2d 399 (1975).
2. GA. CONST. art. I, § III, para. I; GA. CODE ANN. § 2-301 (1973) states that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate
compensation being first paid ..
" The Federal Constitution states, "[nior shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Taking
Clause cases often arise out of alleged excessive governmental regulation which reduces the
value of the plaintiff's property. See Barrett v. Hamby, supra.
3. An analysis of the difficulties facing environmental and land use laws in Georgia is
found in W. Futrell, The Hidden Crisis in Georgia Land Use, 10 GA. L. REV. 53 (1975).
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the court had not, until this term, adjudicated the validity of natural
resource and land use planning laws as such, its hostility toward one kind
of planning law, zoning, has had a chilling affect on legislative proposals
in this area.4 In Barrett, the Georgia Supreme Court articulated the standards which it will apply in deciding whether a zoning ordinance violates
the constitutional provisions against taking private property without just
compensation. The court states,
as the individual's right to unfettered use of his property confronts the
police power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is
that a zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare. Lacking
such justification the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or
unreasonable.'
The court defines substantial as being more or less synonymous with reasonable:
as these critical interests are balanced, if the zoning regulation results in
relatively little gain or benefit to the public while inflicting serious injury
or loss on the owner, such regulation is confiscatory and void. . . . Moreover we specifically rule that for such unlawful confiscation to occur,
requiring that the zoning be voided, it is not necessary that the property
be totally useless for the purpose classified. . . . It suffices to void it that
the damage to the owner is significant and is not justified by the benefit
to the public.
The Barrett case arose out of an application to construct a shopping
center by the owners of the 26-acre Hamby property which was restricted
by the Cobb County zoning ordinance to single family houses on half-acre
lots. The County Board of Commissioners denied the application, basing
their decision on the existing land use plan which already provided for
extensive acreage for commercial development in the area. On appeal, the
commissioners argued that the court should rely on the presumption of
validity which attaches to zoning ordinances because of their legislative
nature. In view of the applicant's detailed testimony as to the financial
burden caused by the refusal to rezone the property and the county's
failure to introduce countervailing testimony concerning the decision's effect on the public welfare and the benefit achieved, the court held that the
alleged community welfare interest was too vague and weighed too lightly
in the balance to offset the owner's substantial injury. Barrett is a rather
conventional American zoning case when compared with cases from other
4. See, e.g., Herrod v. O'Beirne, 210 Ga. 476, 80 S.E.2d 684 (1954); Hunt v. McCollum,
214 Ga. 809, 108 S.E.2d 275 (1959).
5. 235 Ga. at 265, 219 S.E.2d at 402.
6. Id. at 266, 219 S.E.2d at 402.
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jurisdictions in which courts have taken an active position in judicial
review.' Nevertheless, it represents a great step forward for Georgia courts,
as it is the first explicit endorsement of the balancing analysis found in
Georgia Supreme Court decisions and is the first acknowledgement by that
court that zoning and land use planning rest upon the police power.
A few months after Barrett the Georgia Supreme Court decided
MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid TransitAuthority v. Datry,8 a suit brought by
shop owners on a street which had been closed by subway construction and
changed into a pedestrian mall leading to the subway station. The termination of vehicular access to the plaintiffs stores was held to be a taking,
calling for the payment of compensation to the shop owners. Justice Gunter, in a short but sharply reasoned dissent, argued that since the city has
the authority to regulate the use of street easements under its police power,
the termination of vehicular traffic from the street facing the store
entrances was not a taking. Indeed, the termination of vehicular access
should not have resulted in a compensation award at that point in time
because any customers lost because of the street closing will probably be
replaced by new customers using the subway stop. The Datry opinion is
disappointing in its failure to apply the balancing analysis announced by
Barrett, since the damage to the plaintiffs was so consequential and so
speculative at the time of suit that it would appear to have been more
appropriate to have relegated their claim to an inverse condemnation proceeding.
Although Barrett, with its balancing analysis, points to a new strand of
Georgia jurisprudence, other cases of the term suggest that the taking
clause is vital in Georgia jurisprudence and it will be a force to be dealt
with in any case concerning natural resource, environmental, or land use
regulation. If the Georgia courts take into consideration non-economic
matters difficult of quantification, such as the public interest in neighborhood stability or the state's interest in protecting environmental diversity
necessary for the integrity of ecosystems, then comprehensive environmentally based planning laws should be upheld on judicial review. However,
if, in future cases, the courts consider only matters capable of proof in
dollars and cents and do not weigh these abstract factors which are difficult of quantification, then the Barrett analysis will not be the advance it
is presently thought to be.
In view of the General Assembly's concern over the Georgia Supreme
Court's hostility to planning laws, a significant development was the
court's denial of constitutional challenges to the Georgia Land Sales Act
of 1972,' the Surface Mining Act of 1968,10 and the Control of Outdoor
7.

See F. Schnidman, The Courts Enter the Zoning Game: Will Local Government Win
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 590 (1975).
235 Ga. 568, 220 S.E.2d 905 (1975).
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-61 et. seq. (1974).

or Lose?, 43
8.
9.
10.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 43-14 et. seq. (1974).
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Advertising Act of 1973."
In Screamer Mountain Development, Inc. v. Garner, the court brushed
aside constitutional challenges to the Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972
which requires the filing of reports concerning large scale developments
involving 150 or more lots being sold out of a common subdivision. The
Act, aimed at north Georgia resort developers whose activities in the Blue
Ridge Mountain area of the state have been described as the greatest
menace yet to the southern mountains, 13 functions as an anti-fraud statute,
requiring that any developer desiring to promote such a subdivision file an
application for registration with the Secretary of State. The application
requires disclosure of detailed information on the financing and development plans of the resort. 14 A public report is also required for prospective
purchasers who may rescind the contract if valid disclosure is not made. 5
In its first interpretation of the Act, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
a subsequent purchaser is not included in the definition of "purchaser"
and thus falls outside the protection of the statute.
In Georgia Marble Co. v. Walker," the supreme court in its first opinion
on the Surface Mining Act of 1968 held that the Act established only
minimum regulations for surface mining and that counties could enact and
enforce, through their zoning regulations, different or more restrictive requirements than those called for by the Act or the Department of Natural
Resources regulations.
In City of Doraville v. Turner Communications Corp.," the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the state law concerning outdoor advertising
signs had not preempted the police power authority of local governments
to regulate outdoor advertising signs and assumed without discussion that
the statute was valid. Indeed, the only question was whether the community could enact stricter regulations on the basis of its own local police
power authority. The court held that under its police power authority, a
municipality can enact and enforce reasonable regulations governing the
erection and maintenance of signs within its jurisdiction. The court considered the local ordinance governing the regulation of outdoor advertising
signs a regulatory ordinance governing activities and not a zoning ordinance.
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 95A-9 et. seq. (1974).
12. 234 Ga. 590, 216 S.E.2d 801 (1975).
13. See O'Neill, Greatest Menace Yet to Southern Mountains, SOUTHERN VOICES, MayJune 1974, at 73-78.
14. GA. CODE ANN. at 84-6103 (1974).
15. GA. CODE ANN. at 84-6108 (1974).
16. 236 Ga. 545, 224 S.E.2d 394 (1976).
17. 236 Ga. 385, 223 S.E.2d 798 (1976).
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LANDMARK CASES:

THE ENERGY CRISIS AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
BEACHES

Another significant judicial development was the Georgia Supreme
Court's recognition of the far-reaching implications of the energy crisis. A
standard feature of electric utility rate making has been the provision of
discounts to large scale users, giving cheaper incremental rates to industrial consumers. Utilities justified such a rate structure on the grounds
of economy of scale and the desirability of promoting growth in the system.
Following the Arab oil embargo and the beginning of changing attitudes
toward unlimited growth, the Georgia Public Service Commission devised
a new rate structure shifting the cost of expansion on to those users whose
demands were causing the need for additional facilities. In Allied Chemical
Corp. v. Georgia Power Co.,"5 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the new
rate structure stating:
The old notions of rate making, which prevailed before the energy crisis,
sought to maximize energy sales and encourage even greater energy consumption. Now that a true energy crisis is upon us, we would be surprised
to find that this continues to be a goal. With energy now recognized as a
scarce natural resource, conditions might no longer exist for necessarily
favoring large users with low rates. That of course is not for us to decide.
We do decide, however, that nothing in this record shows that it was
unreasonable for the commission to conclude that the largest users were
primarily responsible for the need for increased facilities.
Thus, the Georgia Public Service Commission and the Georgia Supreme
Court join an increasing number of state courts which have revised rate
structures to place a higher cost upon those large scale users of energy
whose demands for more power fuel the ever mounting strain on re9
sources.'
In State v. Ashmore, 0 the Georgia Supreme Court settled the legal questions concerning public and private rights in the foreshore (that area between the high watermark and the low watermark along Georgia's coast)
in favor of the state. This decision defining the boundary between private
and public property as the high watermark is of major significance for
coastal zone management and regulation of coastal resources because it
confirms the state's free hand in administering the area. The plaintiffs,
subdivision lot owners who wanted to develop homes along the dunes and
sand beaches of St. Simons Island, claimed title to the beach down to the
low watermark because of a 1902 General Assembly Act which stated:
18. 236 Ga. 548, 224 S.E.2d 396 (1976).
19. A discussion of the regulatory theories on which the new types of rate structures are
based is found in R. Cudahy and R. Malko, Electric Peak Load Pricing: Madison Gas and
Beyond, 1976 Wisc. L. REV. 47 (1976).
20. 236 Ga. 401, 224 S.E.2d 334 (1976).
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For all purposes, including among others, the exclusive right to the oysters
and clams (but not to include other fish) therein or thereon being, the
boundaries and rights of owners of land adjacent to or covered in whole
or in part by navigable tide waters, as defined . . . shall extend to low

watermark in the bed of the water: Provided, however, that nothing in this
and the two preceding sections shall be so construed as to authorize such
an exclusive appropriation of any tide water, navigable or nonnavigable,
by any person whomsoever, as to prevent the free use of the same by others
for purposes of passage and for the transportation of such freight as may
be capable of being carried thereover'n
The majority, in upholding public ownership and with it the right of the
state to regulate the foreshore without running afoul of the taking clause,
relied on the debates of the 1943-44 Constitutional Commission, which
drafted the current state constitution. In an extensive use of legislative
history, the court declared that the 1902 Act, w) *'h was ratified in the
constitution, gave title only to the oyster and clam oeds. In passing on the
status of the accreted land (the dry land area) which had been built up in
the decades since the area had first been platted, the court recognized the
general principle that gradual accretions of land from navigable tide waters accrue to the adjacent land owner. Holding that the accreted land in
dispute accrued to the owners of the inshore lots, the court nevertheless
held that issues of fact remained to be resolved by the trial court as to
whether the said land had been dedicated to public use or had become
subject to prescriptive rights on the part of the public by continued use.
Two strongly worded dissents argued that the 1902 Act specifically conveyed away all public rights in the tide water area, that no matter what
the value of the tidal zone might be in the 1970's the transfer remained
firm, and that the effect of the majority opinion was to take private property without the payment of just compensation.
III.

MINING

The Georgia Supreme Court cases on mining activity turned primarily
on the problem of controlling waste from mines. While Georgia has a
surface mining statute, no specific statute provides for disposal of waste
from mines and the principles of tort law applicable to injury to land
generally apply. In Morey v. Dixie Lime & Stone Co. ,2 the court of appealsreversed a lower court award of $2,800 to plaintiffs whose property had
been damaged by an overflow of sludge from a neighboring limestone mine.
The court found that the award of $2,800 was not inadequate as a matter
of law on the evidence presented but that the charge to the jury on measurement of damages was misleading. In 1967, plaintiff's predecessor in
21.
22.

GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1309 (1970).
134 Ga. App. 928, 216 S.E.2d 657 (1975).
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title had entered into a settlement agreement with the defendant's predecessor for $7,000 for damage done to the land up to that time. After the
purchase in 1972, the defendants continued to damage plaintiff's property
by dumping sludge and waste from its mining operations. The erroneous
charge concerned the jurors consideration of the settlement sum paid for
prior damage to the property.
In Davidson Mineral Properties,Inc. v. Gifford Hill & Co. ,2 the Georgia
Supreme Court ruled that even though earlier cases had denied an injunction against Gifford Hill's operation of a rock quarry and stone crushing
plant, the plaintiff could press its claim for damages for the nuisance
caused by the defendant's activities. An earlier case, Davidson Mineral
Properties v. Gifford Hill & Co.,2' had denied an injunction because no
actual or threatened injury to the Davidson property had been shown. In
the instant case, the plaintiff sought to present evidence of actual damages
from the operation of the rock quarry. Even though injunctive relief had
been denied, this was held not to be dispositive of plaintiff's damage claim
and summary judgment was held to be inappropriate.
The zoning problems caused by the operations of rock quarry and stone
crushing plants have been discussed in a number of Georgia cases. Most
recently, in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Commission,25 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the denial of a
special use permit for the development of a crushed stone quarry by a
regional planning and zoning commission. This denial runs counter to a
series of cases which have upheld the right of rock quarries and rock crushing plants to operate in rural areas despite the opposition of local county
planning commissions.
IV.

ZONING AND LAND USE

Several important cases on zoning procedure arose during the year. In
Royal Atlanta Development Corp. v. Staffieri,26 the Georgia Supreme
Court held again that the governing authority of the county is the entity
which makes zoning enforcement decisions. In this case, 130 acres in Gwinnett County had been set aside as a planned unit development of homes,
condominiums, stores and recreational facilities. After an adverse decision
by the planning commission adjacent land owners, claiming to be aggrieved persons, appealed to the zoning board of appeals. The appeal was
dismissed for the reason that it had no jurisdiction to entertain appeals
from the planning commission. Plaintiff land owners then appealed to the
Gwinnett Superior Court, which reversed and remanded the case to the
zoning board of appeals. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the zoning
23.
24.
25.
26.

235
232
235
236

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

176, 219 S.E.2d 133 (1975).
77, 205 S.E.2d 269 (1974).
689, 221 S.E.2d 401 (1975).
143, 223 S.E.2d 128 (1976).
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board of appeals had been correct since zoning power clearly lies with the
governing authority, the county board of commissioners. The planning
commission serves as an expert agency whose only function is to advise the
governing authority, the county board of commissioners, which must use
its own discretion in enforcing the zoning ordinance. The court held that
the approval of the planned unit development by the planning commission
was not an enforcement decision and therefore was not subject to challenge
at that point in time.
In City of Douglasvillev. The Willows, Inc. ,"7 the owner of a mobile home
park sought to compel the Board of Commissioners of Douglas County to
issue permits to place trailers on the remaining lots in a mobile home park.
The city, which had allowed much of the area to be filled with mobile
homes, refused to issue the permits despite the fact that the county plan
designated the area in question as "R-5 mobile home park residential
district." The court held this exercise of authority to be invalid as an abuse
of discretion going beyond the limits of the ordinance.
In Walker v. Duncan,28 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the right of
a purchaser of subdivision property to enforce a claim based on reliance
on a subdivision plat which designated a lake area and park as open space.
The court based its decision on the principle that when a developer sells
lots according to a recorded plat, the grantees acquire an easement in any
area set apart for their use. The recorded plat showing the open space
around the lake was taken as an implied promise of the developer to preserve the area as a park. Furthermore, the court held that the designation
of the open space also raised a presumption of intent to dedicate the area
to the public.
V.

WATER LAW

This term saw several applications of the conventional riparian principle
which declares that the owners of the banks of waterways are entitled to
have the water in the streams come to their land in its natural and usual
flow and that flooding or obstruction caused by an unlawful interference
constitutes a trespass. In Trax, Inc. v. City of College Park,29 the city sued
Trax for maintaining an obstruction on Sullivan Creek resulting in upstream flooding. The suit sought removal of the obstruction and restoration
of the stream banks and bed to their original condition so that the watercould follow its natural drainage. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence as to the economic gain gathered from the obstruction and
the negligible damage done to the upstream riparians. However, the court
refused to balance the equities, and entered judgment for the plaintiff city
27.
28.
29.

236 Ga. 488, 224 S.E.2d 363 (1976).
236 Ga. 331, 223 S.E.2d 675 (1976).
235 Ga. 835, 221 S.E.2d 595 (1976).
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holding that the damming was the major, if not the sole, proximate cause
of potential upstream flooding. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed
the trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff city.
In Weems v. Freeman,10the plaintiff sued the adjacent owner of riparian
property, together with a contractor and engineers doing work thereon, for
flooding caused by increased surface runoff resulting from the upstream
construction activity. The jury's award of $50,000 damages and $10,000
attorney's fees was modified by the supreme court on the basis of an out
of court settlement with two of the joint tortfeasors which had the effect
of releasing the third party that had remained in the suit. In the attempt
to deal with such overbuilding in flood plains and increase in surface runoff
waters, government agencies such as the Corps of Engineers and state
governments have moved toward flood plain zoning.3 However, Weems v.
Freeman indicates a significant use of the common law courts and traditional remedies by downstream riparians to protect their rights which may
well be more effective than the complicated administrative system of sanctions against those who overbuild in the flood plain.
In City of Rome v. Turk, 32 the upstream modifier of the waterway was
the city of Rome which pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense to the
claim for damages to the downstream riparian. The Georgia Supreme
Court found that the city's construction of the drainage ditch and modification of the surface water runoff patterns which resulted in water overflowing on plaintiff's property was a continuing nuisance and a willful
trespass which entitled the plaintiffs to compensation for the taking or
damaging of private property.

VI.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation controversies continued to play a major role in confrontation between environmental plaintiffs, property owners, and state officials. Although most of the controversies centered in federal forums, litigation concerning the development of Atlanta's rapid transit system, the new
regional airport, and the state highway system spilled over into the state
courts.
The continuing controversy over the location of Atlanta's regional airport reached the Georgia Supreme Court in Citizens to Save Paulding
County v. City of Atlanta.3 3 On June 17, 1975, the trial court denied injunctive relief to the plaintiffs who sought to bar the purchase of property for
a new Atlanta regional airport in Paulding County. As no supersedeas bond
30.
31.

234 Ga. 575, 216 S.E.2d 774 (1975).
See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Will the Flooding Ever Stop?, METROPOLITAN

ATLANTA WATER RESOURCES STUDY GROUP NEWSLETTER, April 1975, p. 1.

32.
33.

235 Ga. 223, 219 S.E.2d 97 (1975).
236 Ga. 125, 223 S.E.2d 101 (1976).
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was filed following the filing of judgment, the city consumated the contract, and the supreme court held the case to be moot. The Paulding
County controversy has received extensive coverage in the press and in
groups have been
environmental publications, and on-going citizen's
3
formed to continue litigation on other grounds .
In Reed v. City of Atlanta,35 a condemnation proceeding brought by the
City of Atlanta to obtain an avigation easement over Reed's land, the court
considered the noise problems of Atlanta's present airport. A special master estimated damages of $3,350 with further consequential damages of
$11,000. Both the city and Reed appealed for a de novo hearing in the
Fulton County Superior Court, where the jury awarded Reed $5,000 actual
damages and no consequential damages. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Reed's motion for a new trial in an opinion which
reviews the elements of proof in a noise pollution case. The court refused
to permit Reed to show the noise levels in his building as they related to
the Occupational Safety Health Standards regulations, but did allow him
to show the noise level within and outside the building during the period
when aircraft were overhead, together with evidence that such noise levels
would disturb sleep, interfere with communication, and cause annoyance,
hearing loss, physical injury, and pain.
Challenges to the constitutionality of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Authority (MARTA) were rebuffed again in Henderson v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,36 in which the court held that the
amendment establishing MARTA which had received the vote of the substantial majority of voters in Fulton and DeKalb counties did not need
submission to the voters of the entire state. In the Henderson case, the
plaintiffs argued that the state had improperly submitted the question to
the voters because an environmental impact statement had not yet been
filed. Environmental impact statements are a requirement of federal law
and a condition precendent to the beginning of any major federal project
which significantly affects the human environment. The Georgia Supreme
Court acknowledged that an environmental impact statement would be
required in due course, but held that the filing of the statement was not a
prerequisite to the holding of the election. The environmental impact
statement was seen as being a condition precedent to the taking of federal
action concerning MARTA and not to the Georgia voters' approval of the
proposal.
Several federal cases concerning the Georgia projects discussed the timing and need for environmental impact statements. In Atlanta Coalition
on the Transportation Crisis v. Atlanta Regional Commission37 and
34. See J. Dunn, Takeoff and Landing in Atlanta, SIERRA CLUB BULLETIN, March 1976,
Vol. 61, No. 3, at 16.
35. 136 Ga. App. 193, 220 S.E.2d 492 (1975).
36. 236 Ga. 849, 225 S.E.2d 424 (1976).
37. 8 ERC 1116 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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Citizens for Food and Progress,Inc. v. Musgrove,38 the U.S. District Court
refused relief on the ground that the proposals (the West Georgia Limited
Access Highway and the Atlanta Regional Commission's publication of a
systems plan identifying future transportation corridors) were state financed and controlled projects which did not require an environmental
impact statement. A contrary conclusion was reached in Hawthorn Environmental PreservationAssociation v. Coleman,39 which held that a statement must be filed on the Newnan bypass even though the Georgia Department of Transportation claimed that no federal funds were involved.
The court found that the bypass was only one segment of a larger project
which was federal in nature and, for which, compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historical Preservation Act was necessary.
In Pye v. Department of Transportationof the State of Georgia,'" the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff
whose land had been condemned in state court proceedings had no standing to claim damages or restitution under the National Environmental
Policy Act since NEPA has no provision for awarding damages, but is
rather a remedy for judicial review of substantive agency decisions on
projects which may affect the environment.
VII.

LEGISLATION

The most significant action of the 1976 General Assembly was the adoption of an editorial revision of the state constitution which was drafted to
resolve the uncertainties in Georgia planning law. It was ratified by the
voters in the Fall 1976 General Election. Three judicial doctrines have
interacted to create past uncertainty: an unusually broad interpretation of
the taking clause which sacrifices the public interest to private rights; a
uniquely narrow definition of the state's police power which demands specific constitutional grants for zoning laws; and a confusing reading of the
home rule provisions of the Georgia Constitution which suggest that only
local governments are empowered to enact planning laws which restrict
land use." The use of these three doctrines by the Georgia Supreme Court
in years past has resulted in a line of decisions unfriendly toward planning
laws. The General Assembly has moved to dispel these doubts by rewording the provisions effecting regional planning in the new constitution. Article III, Section VIII which reaffirms the police power of the state declares:
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: EXERCISE OF POWERS
Paragraph III. Police Power. The exercise of the police power of the state
38.
39.
40.
41.

397 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
Civil Action No. 76-581A (N.D. Ga. Judgment and Order filed April 30, 1976).
513 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1975).
See discussion in W. Futrell, supra note 3, at 85-120.
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shall never be abridged, nor so construed as to permit the conduct of
business in such manner as to infringe the equal rights of others, or the
general well-being of the State.
Paragraph HIA. Restrictions upon Land Use for the Protectionof Natural Resources, Environment and Vital Areas. The General Assembly shall
have the authority to provide restrictions upon land use in order to protect
and preserve the natural resources, environment and vital areas of this
state.2
This affirmation would clarify the General Assembly's power to pass a
broad based comprehensive environmental protection law such as Florida's
Environmental Land and Water Management Act 3 or the American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code."
The concern with the General Assembly's power to pass general laws
concerning land use is based upon a confused interpretation of the home
rule provisions of the Georgia Constitution enunciated in the 1969 supreme
court decision in Johnston v. Hicks.4 5 In that case the supreme court interpreted the new home rule provisions of the constitution which delegates
all zoning activity to local governments. The court held that a local law
passed by the General Assembly which conflicted with a county zoning
ordinance was invalid. Nowhere in the opinion is it suggested that a general law concerning planning would be invalid. Nevertheless, some commentators have read the Johnston case as broadly as possible and have
suggested that general resource regulation laws such as the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act 6 would be unconstitutional. 7
The General Assembly adopted clarifying language to remove any doubt
as to the validity of general laws affecting natural resource, land use, and
environmental planning. Article IX, Section IV of the proposed constitutional revision, entitled "General Provision Applicable to Local Governments," states:
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph as to planning and
zoning, nothing contained within this Paragraph shall operate to prohibit
the General Assembly from enacting general laws relative to the above
subject matters or to prohibit the General Assembly by general law from
regulating, restricting or limiting the exercise of the above powers, but,
the General Assembly shall not have the authority to withdraw any such
powers. The General Assembly shall act upon the above subject matters
only by general law. If population is used as a basis for classification for
the applicability of any act to any political subdivision or subdivisions of
42. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1198, at 1218.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3801 et. seq. (1975).
44. ALI Model Land Development Code (April 1975 draft).
45. 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969).
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-136 et. seq. (1974).
47. See, e.g., Abbot, Some Legal Problems Involved in Saving Georgia's Marshlands,7
43.

GA. ST. B. J. 27 (1970).
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this State on the above subject matters, the Act shall apply only to political subdivisions of less than a specified population or shall apply to political subdivisions of more than a specified population. The General Assembly shall not, in any manner regulate, restrict, or limit the power and
authority of any county, municipality, or any combination thereof, to plan
and zone as herein defined.'
The intent of the General Assembly is to remove the judicial cloud over
natural resources, land use and environmental planning laws. The proposed constitutional revision makes it clear that local decisions will be in
local hands as the zoning function is vested in local authorities; however,
the General Assembly's power to pass general laws concerning planning is
affirmed.
Most of the press and public coverage of proposed natural resource legislation concerned two bills subordinating wildlife protection to local agricultural interests. One authorized beehive owners to destroy bears under
certain conditions,4 and the other authorized the Department of Natural
Resources to issue permits to farmers permitting them to kill deer causing
damage to their crops.5 ' Both of these bills, which caused intensive lobbying on the part of agricultural forces and wildlife protection spokesmen
masked the General Assembly's positive achievements. The Off-Road Vehicle Act of 1975,"1 is a first step toward regulation of what has become a
nuisance in many rural and forested areas of the state. Section IV of the
Act makes it a misdemeanor punishable by fine to operate an off-road
vehicle on any private property without the express written permission of
the owner or his agent, or to operate a vehicle without operative brakes,
mufflers, or other silencing equipment. The authority of local officials to
adopt ordinances and rules consistent with state law or regulations regulating the time periods and zones of use for off-road vehicles is recognized.
Amendments to the Oil and Gas Deep Drilling Act 2 provide for the
spacing of wells and better conservation practices by the Georgia Department of Natural Resources. The Hazardous Radiation Control Act"
designates the Department of Human Resources as the agency in charge
of the state's radiation monitoring program and the Department of Natural
Resources as the agency in charge of radioactive wastes. Another significant development was the creation of the Georgia Council for Energy Resources composed of 11 members drawn from various state line agencies
and the Georgia Office of Energy Resources within the Office of Planning
and Budget."4 The Office is charged with the preparation of data relating
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to the state's energy needs, a standby emergency plan in case of a serious
energy shortage, and a program for energy conservation. It is to seek and
administer federal funds and programs for energy related research and
planning. The General Assembly's other action in the energy field was to
provide special tax treatment for equipment used in conversion of solar
energy for heating, cooling, or drying 5
55. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 672.

